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Abstract. In the Horizon 2020 funded Future Sky Safety programme, the Human Performance 
Envelope project pushed airline pilots to the edges of their performance in real-time cockpit simulations, 
by increasing stress and workload, and decreasing situation awareness. The aim was to find out how such 
factors interact, and to detect the edges of human performance where some form of automation support 
should be employed to ensure safe continued flight. A battery of measures was used, from behavioural to 
physiological (e.g. heart rate, eye tracking and pupil dilation), to monitoring pilot performance in real 
time. Several measures – e.g. heart rate, heart rate variability, eye tracking, cognitive walkthrough, and 
Human Machine Interface (HMI) usability analysis – proved to be useful and relatively robust in 
detecting performance degradation, and determining where changes in information presentation are 
required to better support pilot performance in challenging situations. These results led to proposed 
changes in a prototype future cockpit human-machine interface, which were subsequently validated in a 
final simulation. The results also informed the development of a ‘Smart-Vest’ that can be worn by pilots 
to monitor a range of signals linked to performance.  
1 The Human Performance Envelope  
The concept of Human Performance Envelope (HPE) 
considers nine Human Factors that influence 
performance. The factors include attention, situation 
awareness, vigilance, teamwork, workload, 
communication, trust, fatigue, and stress. The aim of the 
HPE concept is to map how these factors work alone and 
in an interacting combination and how they lead to a 
Human Performance (HP) modification.  
While several indicators, tests, metrics, and tools to 
measure individual Human Factors have been produced 
over the years, there is still a need to better assess how to 
offer precise ways to monitor the combination and 
interaction of multiple range of factors within a HPE 
framework. This consideration is especially relevant for 
complex Human Factors concepts like stress, fatigue and 
situation awareness. 
In aviation research these factors are not always 
represented by univocal metrics, and are investigated by 
a series of behavioral indicators that mostly focus on 
cognitive concepts (disregarding the emotional aspects 
concerning perception and management) or by 
neurophysiological indexes that require additional 
analysis to better understand the combination of 
processes that they could reflect (e.g. autonomic nervous 
systems modulations).  
To assess the HPE measurement, a series of 
experimental trials were set up in the course of the 
project. Different tasks designed to control and 
manipulate the levels of three human factors (workload, 
stress and situation awareness) in a HPE framework, and 
different configurations of newly developed Human 
Machine Interfaces (HMI), were manipulated in order to 
provoke degradation of pilot performance and to 
measure the impact of the single and combined HPE 
factors on pilots’ performances. 
2 Experimental set-up 
Two experiments were set up in the project and 
conducted with professional airline pilots. The first 
experiment was conducted in an A320 full flight 
research simulator. The second experiments took place 
in a static advanced touch-screen concept-cockpit 
simulator, its flight mode and systems also based on an 
A320.  
Various measurements were used in both 
experiments. They include questionnaires (ISA, NASA-
TLX, SART, SACL), eye-tracking including pupil 
diameter, physiological sensors (electrocardiogram, 
respiration, body temperature, 3-axis acceleration, 
activity), performance curves, behavioural markers, 
video and voice recordings, simulator data, and benefits 
questionnaires. An analysis of mental representation and 
the use of a developed competency assessment tool 
provided further data for the analysis. 
The first experiments were conducted in an A320 
research simulator called AVES (Air VehiclE 
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Simulator). It is a motion simulator with six degrees-of- 
freedom using an electric 60-inch hexapod motion 
cueing system with a 14-ton capacity. The cockpit is a 
nearly complete replica of an Airbus A320-200 with IAE 
V2500 engines. It contains the full set of control and 
display elements in the glare shield, the pedestal and the 
front as well as the overhead panel. The maintenance 
panel and both circuit breaker panels are not included.  
The hardware of the visual system features 15-channel 
LED-projection with a field of view of 240°x 95°. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The DLR AVES flight simulator. 
 
The second experiment was conducted in an 
advanced cockpit simulator called AVIONICS 2020 
COCKPIT. The flight model of the simulator is taken 
from X-Plane simulator A320 and some add-on 
functionalities. The scenery is taken from Prepared 3D 
(Lockheed Martin) simulator. The aircraft is piloted with 
sidesticks, no rudder pedals. This simulator is used as 
demonstrator and as tests bench and validation simulator. 
The cockpit interface is composed of four 17” 
touchscreens that represent the current state of product 
line for cockpits. A Flight Control Unit (FCU) is also 
available above the touchscreens to manage the flight 
parameters of the auto flight system.  
 
Fig. 2. Thales future cockpit simulator. 
 
Two scenarios where developed to measure and 
validate the HPE and to validate the newly developed 
HMI. Scenario 1 consisted of an ILS approach with 
manual control into the airports Frankfurt and Hannover. 
The levels of the different HPE factors were varied in a 
total of 8 runs. The first run was the baseline with no 
events happening and the factors a normal low level. In 
the second, third and fourth run the level of workload 
was varied from medium to very high. In the fifth run the 
level of stress was set to high while in the sixth run the 
level of situation awareness was highly reduced. Within 
run seven and eight the three human factors were 
combined and their level varied from medium to high. 
Each run lasted around 15 to 20 minutes.  
The events associated with the increase of workload 
were turbulence (medium or high), approach and runway 
change. Low fuel situation, delay vectors and loud noise 
were used to produce an increase in stress. The reduction 
of situation awareness was generated by the events low 
visibility, localiser interference and wind shift. 
Scenario 2 consisted of an approach into the airport 
Bremen while the following events took place which 
increased the levels of the HPE factors to a maximum 
during the run. The levels were not individually and 
selectively varied as in scenario 1.  
 
 Approaching Bremen with standard fuel for 50 min 
remaining flight time 
 Preparation of CAT1 approach RWY 27 
 Go‐around during ILS approach RWY 27 due to 
slow preceding (VFR) traffic 
 During downwind ELEC AC BUS 1 FAILURE 
 Constantly increasing workload due to the 
procedure and the time needed 
 Decision making and handling of complexity under 
low fuel conditions 
 CAT2 ILS approach RWY 09 
 Possible engine flame‐out due to amount of fuel 
 
Scenario 2 lasted around 45 minutes.  
Overall, 30 first officers from a major European 
airline flying A320 aircraft participated in the studies as 
test candidates. The flight crew was complemented by a 
briefed captain of the same airline. The captain flew all 
scenarios and runs with all 30 first officers. The 30 first 
officers (2 female, 28 male) were aged between 28 and 
41 (M = 32, SD = 3.79). On average they had a total 
flight experience ranging from 2250 to 8500 hours (M = 
4045, SD = 1706) and on average 3765 hours on the 
A320 (SD = 1585). Their current flight experience 
(flight hours within the last 12 month) was on average 
640 hours (SD = 104). 
Ten first officers took part in the first simulator 
experiments. As the second experiment consisted of two 
different HMI settings, 20 first officers participated in 
those experiments. This way 10 first officers flew with 
the basic (current) HMI of the cockpit simulator and the 
other 10 first officers flew with the advanced (newly 
developed) HMI. The different HMI settings in the 
second experiment were chosen in order to determine 
and control the differences between the A320 full flight 
research simulator (called Step 1) and the cockpit 
simulator with the basic A320 HMI set-up (called Step 
2). This approach allowed a comparison of the advanced 
HMI set-up (called Step 3) with the set-up and 
conditions of Step 1 and Step 2, and enabled an 
evaluation of the new HMI.  
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3 Physiological Measures 
The CSEM system [1] for monitoring the physiological 
parameters (smart vest) is based on the use of three 
cooperative sensors. The vest allows the measurements 
of the following signals: 
 Two electrocardiograms (ECG) leads; 
 A transthoracic bio-impedance; 
 Skin temperature; 
 Accelerometer; 
 Multi-channel photoplethysmography (PPG). 
Fig. 3. CSEM smart vest. 
 
From these signals several physiological measures 
were estimated. However the most promising results 
were obtained with ECG derived features as also 
confirmed in a review study by Straussberger & Schaefer 
(2004): 
 
 Heart rate (HR), the number of contractions (beats) 
of the heart per minute (bpm).  
 Heart rate variability (HRV), is the variation of 
the NN intervals (normal R-R intervals). This 
variability can be estimated by utilizing different 
methods to extract in its turn different features. Two 
of these methods are: 
 
 Time-domain method: 
o SDNN, standard deviation of the NN 
intervals and often described as the 
total variability; 
o  
 Frequency-domain method; by analysing 
different frequency bands: 
o HF, High frequency (0.15 – 0.4 Hz). 
Describes the parasympathetic 
modulation; 
o LF, Low frequency (0.04 – 0.15 Hz). 
Describes the sympathetic modulation; 
3.1 Results & Discussion 
As demonstrated in previous studies [2], there was a 
clear increase of HR during the duration of the different 
runs (except Run 5). In particular when the HR values 
were normalized and when the analysis were constrained 
to the phase 2 period. The SDNN also showed a clear 
pattern of a decrease with an increase in workload which 
has also been shown in previous studies such as [2, 3]. 
Compared to the other measures, SDNN was not 
statistically different when runs with workload were 
compared to the runs with mixed factors. 
As the literature have already shown [2, 3], the 
frequency domain HRV features also demonstrated a 
significant difference between the runs. However, the 
factor that exhibited the highest response was the run 
with high stress. The spectral analysis of the HRV 
consisted of first the HF, which measures fast variations 
in the frequency domain and reflects the parasympathetic 
(vagal) modulation. HF reached the highest significance 
when Run 5 was compared to the baseline in both the 
single and group analysis. The LF feature showed the 
same tendency as HF in the group analysis. However, in 
the single pilot analysis the LF response was almost the 
same when Run 5 was compared to the baseline and 
when Run 8 was compared to the baseline. This is not 
surprising, since LF expresses slower variations of the 
frequency domain that reflects both parasympathetic and 
sympathetic modulation in comparison to HF where only 
the parasympathetic modulation is taken into account.  
The run that showed no clear pattern in this case is 
Run 6 (reduced SA) and it is therefore difficult to 
interpret it. There was always a tendency of a decrease, 
but it was not significant in the single pilot analysis and 
the same for HF in the group analysis. No literature was 
found so far describing whether degradation of SA has 
an effect on the physiological response. Run 8, which 
contains the mixed factors, showed to be highly 
significant when compared to Run 1 in the single pilot 
analysis and also did Run 5 (high stress alone). 
However, in the group analysis the distribution of Run 8 
started to increase in width, but remained always 
significant with respect to Run 1.  
3.2 Summary 
The outcomes of this experiment have shown that 
physiological measures such as HR, SDNN, HF, LF and 
VLF can be sensitive to an increase in workload and/or 
stress. The runs with SA degradation on the other hand 
showed very often no clear pattern and remained 
therefore difficult to interpret. HR and SDNN were 
particularly sensitive to the increase in workload, while 
the HRV features derived from the spectral analysis (HF, 
LF and VLF) showed a significant response to the 
increase of stress as well. The single pilot versus group 
analysis showed the importance of normalizing HR 
values when conducting the group analysis (in particular 
the phase 2 analysis). This is not surprising since an 
“absolute” HR value is much more subject dependent 
than HRV that express a type of “variability” which 
results in HR being more sensitive to inter-subject 
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variability. In summary, the physiological measures 
employed in the simulations can measure changes in 
workload and stress, but not situation awareness.  
Since the ultimate aim of this work was to improve 
cockpit support to the pilots, several approaches were 
utilised to understand and track what was happening to 
their situation awareness during the scenarios. These 
measures used, respectively, eye movement tracking, a 
cognitive walkthrough approach, and a questionnaire and 
interview method. The results of these approaches, and 
their impact on HMI evaluation, are described below.  
4 Eye Movement Tracking Analysis 
This section details two treatments of the eye-tracking 
data acquired in Scenario 1 of the two-week simulation 
conducted at DLR Braunschweig, in Germany, in May 
2016. The aim of this work was two-fold. Firstly, to 
understand movement of point of regard in relation to 
scenario events and secondly, to begin to understand 
pilot situation awareness (SA) in response to scenario 
events through detailed analysis of gaze behaviour. In 
support of these twin aims, we provide a detailed 
analysis of pilot point of regard across a run. 
In the run, pilots were required to fly an ILS 
approach with manual control landing at Frankfurt 
airport, runway 25L. The run starts with increased 
turbulence which remains throughout the whole run. 
Three events were introduced to challenge the pilots. 
These events were low fuel, delay vectors and the 
sudden introduction of a loud noise. The low fuel is an 
issue from the start of the run. Delay vectors occur from 
the beginning of the run during initial approach - 
between the intermediate approach fix (IAF) and the 
final approach fix (FAF). The loud noise occurs during 
final approach (between FAF and landing) and lasts for 
approximately one and a half minutes.  
Low visibility is an issue throughout the whole run, 
localiser interference occurs during final approach 
(between FAF and landing), and there is a wind shift, 
from head to tail during the final approach (between 
FAF and landing). These runs were designed to decrease 
situation awareness. 
The analysis of the eye tracking data and the cockpit 
dialogue was able to identify how SA was shared 
between the captain and FO (first officer) and how this 
was managed. In most cases, the Captain initiated cross 
checking with the FO. At a surface level this would 
indicate that the Captain had better SA than the FO. 
However, the FO spent the majority of their time 
focussed on their PFD, which may indicate a level of 
shared SA between the captain and the FO, with the FO 
being supported by their PFD. It was apparent in some 
situations that the FO was effectively ‘offloading’ their 
SA to the Captain, with the FO cross referencing 
information on their instruments when required. 
Although the eye tracking data cannot explicitly detect 
performance degradation or recovery strategy, it is able 
to indicate how the flight crew reacted at key points. For 
example, when the low fuel situation was realised. This 
resulted in a significant change in strategy for the flight 
team, as they then had to manage the low fuel situation. 
The realisation of the limited fuel level led to the FO and 
captain working together to establish the future state of 
the aircraft: Explicit evidence of level 3 SA (anticipating 
the future) was captured when the FO was required to 
project the amount of time remaining given the amount 
of fuel. The proactive approach of the Captain was 
different to the reactive approach of the FO. This can be 
observed through the analysis of the dialogue, supported 
by the eye tracking data. They managed to recover the 
situation by sharing information and crosschecking. A 
certain amount of cognitive processing was also required 
in order to calculate the remaining fuel time. Their 
misalignment in views (the captain wanting to call 
emergency but the FO not agreeing) could have been due 
to a number of things; the Captain’s SA was being 
supported by external information being fed directly to 
him, in addition to observing the FO’s actions and 
monitoring the instruments. The FO’s SA was supported 
by the information being fed to him by the captain, along 
with his own instruments. They were using different 
information, which as a result built different mental 
models. It is difficult to envisage how this could be 
better supported by the interface, but this mismatch 
indicates that it could potentially be improved; whether 
this is by interface improvement or SOP changes will 
need additional analysis.  
 
Fig. 4. Eye tracking in A320 simulator.  
 
Evidence of comprehension was reached on more 
occasions, notably during the loud noise, when the FO 
was able to establish that there was nothing wrong with 
the aircraft and that the current situation was normal, by 
monitoring his instruments. In effect, the FO’s SA was 
being supported by the instruments. For the remainder of 
the run, the FO effectively offloaded his SA requirement 
to the captain, who, through communications with ATC 
and constant monitoring of the instruments may have 
had a more accurate, holistic view of the state of the 
aircraft than the FO.  
This proof of concept has demonstrated that this type 
of approach to eye tracking analysis can be valuable in 
giving us an insight into the SA of the eye tracking 
wearer. This enables us to make certain inferences about 
the information that is important, and what is 
comprehended and carried forward.  
Having established that eye tracking can help 
understand what information is used and when, the next 
step was to go deeper into the pilot’s cognitive 
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processes, to see how the pilot reasons about the 
information in order to make critical decisions. 
5 Cognitive Analysis 
Cognitive engineering is an interdisciplinary approach to 
analyse, design, and evaluation of complex 
sociotechnical systems [4]–[8]. There are a large number 
of methods for designing and evaluating interfaces [9]. 
Methods such as Cognitive Walkthrough (CWT), 
Cognitive Work Analysis [7] and Critical Decision 
Method, which allow the analysis of the activity through 
the cognitive processes associated with it. However, 
none of these methodologies creates a causal link 
between the user's cognitive process, their mental 
representation and the HMI used. Therefore, during the 
project we developed a method based on a cognitive 
walkthrough, observation of the activity and 
demographic data. This method makes it possible to 
collect the mental representation of the co-pilots who 
performed the scenario. We called this method MERIA, 
for Mental Representation Impact Analysis. 
In a control room near the simulator two cognitive 
scientists observed the FO using two cameras placed in 
the cockpit. They identified the key elements of the FO’s 
performance. Just after completing the scenario, the FO 
underwent a cognitive debrief (CWT), with an 
aeronautical expert present to help understand the 
technical elements. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Cognitive analysis during simulation. 
 
The results were represented through a matrix that 
includes in columns the chronological evolution of the 
events and in rows the link between interface and mental 
representation. This allows detection of interfaces that 
create good mental representations and those that do not. 
Mental misrepresentations are those that do not allow the 
co-pilot to understand the situation and therefore make 
good decisions.  
Using these grids, workshops with the consortium's 
experts were able to determine HMI solutions that could 
solve the problems encountered by the co-pilots. As an 
example, for 6 of the 10 FOs, it was not easy to 
understand the technical failure in one of the scenarios 
and its impact on the choices to be made and landing.  
 
 
Fig. 6. MERIA cognitive flowchart. 
 
The solution chosen was to rank the list of 
inoperative systems according to the severity of the 
impact. In addition, an explanation of the impact of these 
inoperative systems was provided. This solution was 
then tested via a panel of 10 other FOs and all of them 
had a better mental representation of the failure and its 
consequences. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Advanced HMI example. 
6 Behavioural Measures 
6.1 Pilot’s Acceptance and HPE Performance 
The UX Acceptance Index, based on the adaptation of 
technology acceptance model [10], was deployed to 
systematically collect pilot’s “user experience” with the 
new HMI, administering 30 items that described five 
main dimensions (Perceived Ease of use, Perceived 
Usefulness, perceived impact on Workload, Situation 
Awareness and Decision Making). At the same time, the 
way the new HMI impacted on the pilot’s performance 
was investigated by the HPE Performance Curve (see 
figure below from one of the more challenging scenarios 
in Step 1). This allowed the Human-Factor experts to 
collect pilot’s narratives describing the variations in two 
HPE dimensions during four different moments of the 
flight scenario, enabling also a numerical representation 
of this experience. 
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Fig. 8. HPE curve example (Step1). 
6.1.1 Ease of Use 
Overall, the advanced HMIs used in Step 2 and Step 3, 
were considered more easy to use (Q3, Q6, Q7) than the 
current A320 cockpit F(1,20)=34.298, p<.001, ηp2=.985. 
The browsing through flight detail information seemed 
to be easier thanks to the new NAV-Display and that 
impacted positively on the perceived performance 
efficacy. In the words of the pilots: “It was like 
comparing an I-Phone vs. an old Nokia model”. 
However, some negative remarks were provided for the 
touch-screen flaps: touchscreen flaps missed tactile 
feedback and that was foreseen to have negative impact 
on safety and to be more time consuming in performing 
task compared to physical flaps (that do not need 
additional visual attention to be manoeuvred). 
6.1.2 Perceived Usefulness 
The HMI in both steps was perceived more useful (Q5, 
Q8, Q9, Q17, Q22, Q24, Q25) than the current A320 
interface F(1,20)=238.629, p<.001, ηp2=.993, especially 
in supporting the pilots during the ECAM Procedure 
(M=4.35, SD=0.4) and also in reducing the likelihood of 
errors related to task-execution (M=4.60, SD=0.9). For 
general monitoring tasks (M=3.50, SD=1.1) and piloting 
tasks (M=3.20, SD=08), no particular improvement 
compared to the A320 interface were perceived in Step 2 
and 3, mostly because there were “missing information 
in the present version of the HMI tested” (e.g. selected 
altitude on PFD, speed-bands for flap extensions, etc.). 
6.1.3 Perceived Impact on Workload 
Overall, the HMI in both steps was considered to better 
impact Workload (Q10, Q11) compared to the current 
A320 cockpit F(1,20)=289.360, p<.001, ηp2=.971, 
especially in unexpected/abnormal situations (M=4.0; 
SD=0.8): “I like the presentation of INOPS system and 
resulting limitations. Everyone is seeing what is being 
done. You see what you have done without having 
constantly to keep it all in mind”. 
6.1.4 Perceived Impact on Situation Awareness 
The HMI is considered to have an overall positive effect 
on Pilot’s Situation Awareness (Q12, Q13, Q19, Q20, 
Q21, Q28) compared to A320, but only for Step 3 pilots 
F(1,20)=3.265, p=.035, ηp2=.601. The main difference 
was mostly related to the contribution provided by the 
question on Tunnel Attention F(1,20)=6.785, p=.018, 
ηp2=.74 (“It showed me clearly that runway 27 was not 
available, so it made me think about it: ‘Why not?”) and 
the question on Fuel Awareness F(1,20)=9.101, p=.007, 
ηp2=.336. Step 2 Pilots considered the new interface not 
as effective for promoting fuel awareness, even 
compared to the regular A320 interface, while Step 3 
Pilots, instead, considered the new HMI significantly 
more likely to increase their Fuel Awareness: “I was 
getting focused on repairing the failure, and I have this 
‘fuel-circle’ closing in, it catches my attention on fuel 
immediately”.  
 
Fig. 9. Advanced HMI solution. 
6.1.5 Impact on Decision Making 
Overall, the new HMI was perceived as more capable to 
support Pilot’s ability in some specific problem-solving 
situations (Q4, Q14, Q15, Q16, Q27, Q30) compared to 
current A320, but only for Step 3 pilots F(1,20)=6.000, 
p=.038, ηp2=.594. In particular, only one item was in the 
main responsible for the statistical difference, that was 
the one referring to the “Decisions on Alternate 
Airports” (Q30) F(1,20)=5.444, p=.031, ηp2=.232: “In 
the planning phase it will help for deciding alternate 
airport. You could look up at the information to do a real 
assessment, it is definitely something good...” 
6.2 HPE Performance Curve Results 
The overall scores of Performance x Load were 
calculated for all the 4 main points identified by the 
pilots. It appeared that all ten Step 2 pilots declared to be 
at the same starting point describing as relaxed and 
performing well (T1 M=54.00; SD=0.0), but all of them 
reached the worst levels of load in the sample towards 
the end of the scenario (T4 M=32.00; SD=11.3).  
 
On the other hand, pilots in Step 3 already started to 
be more alerted since the beginning of the run (T1 
M=47.70; SD=4.34), but without reaching the levels of 
critical Performance x Load levels reached on average 
by Step 2 pilots  (Error! Reference source not found.). 
The difference at T1 was statistically significant 
F(1,20)=21.000, p<.001, ηp2=.991. When asked to 
describe the worst moments, in Step 2 four pilots 
reached their peak when making the decision on the 
airport to go to (pilots n. 21, 26, 27, 28). On the contrary, 
most of the Step 3 pilots reported to be already focused 
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from the beginning, because they had earlier the 
information on the “Fuel Situation” and that probably 
prevented them being caught off-guard when having to 
make the decisions about the alternate airport.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Performance Curve Results : Step 2 on the left vs. Step 
3 on the right 
7 What have we learned? 
The HPE concept, restricted to three factors, has been 
investigated, and the experiments demonstrated that the 
shape of this envelope evolves consistently with the 
events encountered within the scenarios. The HPE 
representation can be considered as a valid concept to 
assess the constraints that press on the crew: when the 
situation becomes more difficult to handle, the size of 
the envelope decreases. Nevertheless the dimensions 
used to represent the HPE space have to be coherently 
selected for the target scenario. They have to be as 
independent as possible while overlaying all the relevant 
facets of the target situation. As an example a factor 
related to fatigue should be used for a study about long 
range flights, while it was not necessary in the scenarios 
taken for this study. 
The selection and evaluation of the contribution of 
relevant factors to the HPE concept is a decisive step and 
we recommend relying on experiments allowing a 
controlled manipulation of these factors. In our study, 
this part had been done thanks to pre-experiments and 
scenario 1 where events dedicated to modify one (or 
few) dimensions of the HPE were used. Controlling the 
influence of typical events on the shape of the HPE is a 
necessary step before designing more complex and 
realistic scenarios. As the HPE combines several 
connected dimensions it is highly recommended to 
apprehend how they evolve and combine in elementary 
situations before using this construct in a more complex 
scenario. 
The assessment of the evolution of these factors can 
sometimes be done thanks to psycho-physiological 
measures. The study confirmed that the use of ECG and 
eye-tracking is relevant to track on time the evolution of 
this envelope. While the shape of the HPE at one time 
can be evaluated and used to better describe the pressure 
of the situation on the crew, it is more difficult to use it 
to predict performance, and the ‘edges’ of performance.  
This HPE study confirms that there is not a linear 
relationship between HPE factors and performance. 
When task difficulty and operational pressure rise, the 
shape of the envelope is lowered, but the crew adapts 
their behaviour as long as possible to maintain 
reasonable performance. Therefore it would be 
beneficial to conduct dedicated controlled experiments to 
assess if physiological measures could be used to detect 
when the crew reaches the edge of the HPE and 
performance really decreases.  
The experiment also pinpoints the difficulty in 
assessing performance in a real flight. In many cases, 
there are no “continuous” performance indicators but 
rather adequate decisions which are or are not taken by 
the crew. So a key element is rather how the crew 
considers all the elements of the situation and makes 
decisions. Therefore it should be relevant to progress on 
methodologies and tools to better analyse eye tracking 
and electro-encephalography data. A combination of 
these elements could indicate which information is taken 
(eye-tracking) and how it is processed by the operator.  
Finally, the study should also be extended to better 
apprehend the HPE and performances of the crew. This 
study has been made with a cooperative captain and the 
evaluation of the HPE was made on the first officer. This 
was necessary to develop and test the concept. 
Nevertheless, in a real flight, performances and decisions 
are always supported by both crew members, and it 
would be valuable to explore how these elements can be 
extended to a team. 
8 What does it all mean for the pilot? A 
word from a Captain 
The life of a pilot is easy – when everything works fine. 
But whenever a technical abnormal occurs, the situation 
can change within seconds. Out of nowhere, an excellent 
collaboration and communication with the other pilot, air 
traffic control and the cabin crew is necessary. The 
quality of automation and the human machine interface 
during the abnormal define the amount of resources 
available to the pilots. The more resources, the better the 
pilot’s situational awareness and, in consequence, their 
decision making. In this study, and like on all of today’s 
air planes, pilots have two computers systems available. 
The ECAM system of the aircraft and an electronic 
device called EFB from the airline: 
The ECAM (electronic centralized aircraft 
monitoring system) is built into the aircraft and is part of 
the certification process of the manufacturer. It is usually 
in a middle screen so that both pilots can work with it. 
The interface is up to the manufacturer, as it is part of 
the certification process. As the certification process is 
very complex and time consuming, only minor changes 
may be conducted. During initial training, pilots learn to 
handle the ECAM abnormals and study its systems. 
The EFB (electronic flight bag) is an add-on, 
depending on the choice of the individual company. 
Usually it is a Microsoft or Apple tablet device that  
includes multiple additional functions and company 
documentation. It supports the pilots both in normal and 
in abnormal situations. In the normal operation, it helps 
to improve the processes and efficiency of the operation, 
and during abnormal operation it offers all kind of 
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information which helps the pilots to gather safety 
relevant information whenever needed.  
There is a big security concern that a virus from an 
external device might take over control of the aircraft 
and its systems. Therefore, due to security reasons, both 
computers have a very limited interface. 
Many abnormal handlings are already executed by 
computers. The new delivered Airbus A350 can perform 
an auto descent after detecting a high cabin altitude 
which requires an emergency descent. The further 
improvement of the flight control systems increases in 
cadence with the increase of computer processing power. 
Despite the constant training of abnormal situations in 
the simulator, the key to success will be the quality of 
support provided by the computers. As the aircraft 
systems may not be changed due to certification, the 
focus will be on an additional device like the EFB. 
Similar to the invention of the iPhone, the EFB has the 
opportunity to provide the pilot with all necessary 
information.  
The quality of help will depend on the information it 
has available and on the ergonomic handling of the 
device. Computers that store relevant information like a 
library with alphabetic order are likely to fail the needs 
of pilots. During time pressure, cognitive computing is 
necessary. Cognitive computing may tell us where to 
land, how much fuel and time we have left, or point on 
something we might have forgotten: everything a pilot 
needs in that specific situation, with the right 
presentation given the situation’s context and priorities. 
Cognitive computing is by definition, “the ability of 
computers to simulate and complement human’s 
cognitive abilities of decision making”. The computer 
will not take over the decision making by the pilot. The 
responsibility and liability will still remain with the pilot 
and the computer may be considered as a guide to 
support the pilot’s decision making.  
Artificial intelligence may only be incorporated if the 
pilot knows the basis of his decision and if he has the 
final decision. AI is expected to solve problems that 
people are not even aware of, or, in other words, to make 
decisions on their own, thus minimizing the role of 
humans. This is a common misunderstanding of what AI 
is supposed to do on board of an airplane. Due to the 
present liability issues and the exceptional high demand 
for safety in aviation, a computer will not any time soon 
be reliable for the safe conduct of a flight.  
This study of Future Sky Safety points the way to 
defining the limits of human performance. The pilot 
must always be aware of their situational awareness and 
know the risk of the present flight situation. The EFB 
will be the only device able to support the pilot with 
necessary information. The path for a future single pilot 
operation will depend on the abilities of the EFB and its 
ergonomic interface with the pilot. Present research 
could clarify that autonomous flights with passengers 
and no pilots on board is still some way off in the future.  
 
9 Conclusions  
This study has found ways of influencing, measuring and 
tracking three key human factors in flight upset 
situations – workload, stress and situation awareness – in 
dynamic and realistic cockpit simulation experiments. 
The methods have also been used to identify and validate 
cockpit HMI changes to improve performance in 
demanding scenarios. The Human Performance 
Envelope approach therefore offers a new way to 
increase the safety and resilience of human performance 
in flight upset and other risk-based situations, and so 
could be considered as a means to improve pilot training 
and future cockpit design.    
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